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You Can't Get There from Here: Managing 
Judicial Review of Immigration Cases 
Lenni B. Bensont 
As in mathematics, so in natural philosophy, the investi-
gation of difficult things by the method of analysis, ought 
ever to precede the method of composition. 1 
For centuries alchemists studied the properties of metals, 
hunting for the magical method that would render lead into gold. 
The great scientist Sir Isaac Newton devoted dozens of years to 
the pursuit of mercurial methods that would create the desired 
transmutation.2 He pored over the secret works of alchemists 
and kept his own notes in code. He never found the mercury that 
would transform lead into gold. Yet it is Newton's contributions 
to the development of a scientific approach, his careful meas-
urements and his insights into the gravitational forces that ulti-
mately transformed science. 
This paper argues that Congress and policy analysts must 
stop hunting for the magical alchemy that can transform immi-
gration law enforcement into a perfect or "golden" system. 
Rather, we must turn our energies to developing a better under-
standing of the fundamental elements that combine or divide and 
shape the existing process before we can successfully design a 
better system. I add my voice to a growing body of administrative 
law scholars urging a more robust examination of the complex 
t Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Justice Action Center, New York Law 
School. Thank you to my colleagues at New York Law School who commented on this 
paper, Seth Harris, Carlin Meyer, Sadiq Reza, Stephen Ellmann, Zuhayr Moghrabi. I am 
also very grateful to my research assistants, Jennifer V. Rogers, Stephanie Sado and 
Brian Drozda, class of 2008 and Jamie Kuebler, class of 2009. I also benefited from many 
conversations with alumna Sarah Kroll-Rosenbaum, class of 2005, and John R.B. Palmer. 
Thank you to my husband, John I. Wellington, for sharing the story of Newton the al-
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1 Issac Newton, Optiks (1704). An excerpt is available at <http://www.fordham.edu/ 
halsall/mod/newton-optics.html> (last visited Feb 22, 2007). 
2 For a short biography of Newton, see James Gleick, Isaac Newton (Pantheon 2004). 
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operation of systems before Congress or the agencies endeavor to 
solve problems of design and administration. 3 
This paper is being written as Congress once again embarks 
on its search for the process and techniques that will result in 
clearer and more efficient enforcement of our immigration laws. 
While there are many different immigration policy initiatives in 
Congress, in this paper I will focus on the narrow example of ju-
dicial review of administrative immigration orders. Congress has 
once again considered restricting or re-channeling judicial review 
of immigration orders as an essential part of successful immigra-
tion law enforcement. I describe some of the current legislative 
proposals below. Knowing the history of judicial review of immi-
gration orders and having read the transcripts of recent Con-
gressional hearings, I have concluded that the statutory ap-
proaches reflect a search for a miracle "mercury" rather than a 
scientific approach. Newton's principles for studying phenomena 
present a refreshing change from the speculations currently rag-
ing in the debates about the best "process" and "forum" for judi-
cial review of administrative decisions. Congress must require 
greater inquiry and analysis before it designs the process, with-
out this analysis it is likely to implement changes that simply do 
not achieve the legislative goals. More than just calling for Gov-
ernment Accountability Office ("GAO") studies or other empirical 
assessments, I urge these legislators to think about the process 
in action. What are the dynamics of the judicial review process? 
What are the forces that work upon the design of the system and 
change the predicted outcomes or influence the cost and effi-
ciency of the system? 
One of the problems with the current analysis of the judicial 
review process is the narrow focus of the empirical inquiry. Ex-
perts testify about the workload of the federal courts and its ex-
ponential growth, but no one has fully explored the factors that 
have combined and intertwined to motivate more litigants to 
pursue federal court review. Most of the data and the accompa-
nying assessments of the data are presented in isolation. For ex-
ample, we have raw data on the volume of cases heard and dis-
posed of in the administrative process but little information 
about the content and subject matter of those decisions. We can 
3 See, for example, David Zarin, Best Practices in Administrative Law, 81 NYU L 
Rev 294 (2006); Donald T. Hornstein, Complexity Theory, Adaptation, and Administrative 
Law, 54 Duke L J 913 (2005); Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the 
Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 Minn L Rev 342, 345 (2004). 
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find data on the remand rate from the federal courts back to the 
agency but no analysis of why those cases merited remand. More 
importantly, the raw data do not reveal the strategies or motiva-
tions of the actors in the process. 
I had to locate and synthesize the reports of several different 
actors to get a picture of the relative growth in the workloads of 
the immigration judges, the administrative appellate body, and 
the federal courts. Even this rough "mashup" of data produces 
immediate insight into the system. Below in Figure 1, is a chart 
revealing growth in the caseloads at all levels. While the immi-
gration cases are growing rapidly, the workload of the BIA re-
mains relatively constant. This snapshot reveals 12,000 review 
petitions in the federal courts, while the agency has processed 
more than 365,000 claims. To me, this is not a very high rate of 
appeal. Further, while the number of federal cases is growing, 
the rate of increase is slowing. While there was a doubling of ap-
peals from 2002 to 2003, the next increase was around 25 per-
cent and then around 20 percent. Last year there was a slight 
decrease in the rate of review.4 
4 The data in this table are derived from the following sources: US Department of 
Justice, Executive Office for Immigration Review ("EOIR"), FY 2006 Statistical Year Book 
(Feb 2007) ("EOIR 2006 Statistical Year Book"), available at <http://www.usdoj.gov/ 
eoir/statspub/fy06syb.pdf> (last visited May 10, 2007); James C. Duff, 2006 Annual Re-
port of the Director 115 Table B-3 (Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts 2006), avail-
able at <http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2006/appendices/b3.pdf> (last visited May 10, 
2007). It is noteworthy that the statistics presented on this topic in the 2005 fiscal year-
book changed for the same period in the 2006 yearbook and the agency provides the fol-
lowing explanation: "Data in this report have been updated, and thus may be slightly 
different from previously published statistical yearbook data." EOIR 2006 Statistical Year 
Book at iv. 
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Figure 1 
Comparison of Workloads of Immigration Judges, 
the Board of Immigration Appeals, and 
Federal Court Review of Immigration Decisions 
352,869 
365,851 
[2007: 
350,000 ------------------------ -
200,000 
150,000 
100,000 
2002 
296,120 302,049 
2004 2005 
~CJJJJ~o1~iD=•c=iS=ion~s ------~-c=s~iA-=o·=-CiS~-i-O=ns_~l!il=F~edercll court Review 
2003 
Sources: EOIR 2006 Statistical Year Book at B2, 82 (cited in note 4); 
Duff, 2006 Annual Report at 115-20 Table B-3 (cited in note 4). 
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Yet, without understanding the forces that push and pull the 
workloads, how can we accurately assess the performance of the 
process? Phrased differently, even if we all agreed upon the con-
tours and qualities of a judicial review scheme-the "there"-we 
simply cannot reach that goal until we understand the multiple 
factors that form the "here." Without that study of the dynamics 
of the system and its component parts, we are attempting a form 
of modern legal alchemy. Admittedly, it is always difficult for us 
to separate process from substance in the debates about the 
forms and variety of judicial review. When Congress or the Ex-
ecutive expresses concern about the amount or quality of judicial 
review, they are really looking at a byproduct of our substantive 
policy. However, without systemic analysis, our substantive 
goals will be frustrated, and the elusive new paradigm will re-
main beyond our reach. We won't be able to get "there" unless we 
understand and can survey the "here." 
Critics of existing procedures frequently express the view 
that judicial review reflects the manipulation of process to evade 
the substance of the law. If this is true, how significant is this 
observation to the entire system of immigration law enforce-
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ment? Is this motivation so significant that it justifies reform of 
the system or elimination of judicial review? Surely the answers 
to these questions require sophisticated empirical study. 
Even if Congress used the best scientific analytical models, 
the reform of judicial review is unlikely to lead to improved im-
migration law enforcement. First, the largest forces shaping en-
forcement are the actions and decisions of the enforcement agen-
cies. These agencies have many informal enforcement mecha-
nisms that bypass the administrative courts and can preclude 
judicial involvement as well.5 Moreover, the agencies have the 
discretion to offer voluntary departure or self-removal to indi-
viduals before administrative procedures begin. 6 As I will elabo-
rate below, the role of discretion in the agency should receive 
greater scrutiny from Congress and policy analysts. Further, the 
dynamics of our system of government mean that attorneys will 
use statutory classifications and administrative process to the 
best of their abilities to protect individual liberty and to promote 
the interests of their clients. Attacking judicial access results in 
attorneys seeking ways to protect the rule of law. 7 Whatever the 
ultimate design of the system, the actors within it will bend it or 
5 For example, the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") can reject more appli-
cations for admission at the border via the mechanism of expedited removal found in the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (''INA"), INA § 235(b)(l)(A)(i), 8 USC § 1225(b)(l)(A)(i) 
(2000). This procedure provides for administrative review only in cases where an individ-
ual presents a credible fear of persecution or if the individual is within a protected class 
of individuals entitled to greater statutory and procedural protections. This class in-
cludes: citizens, lawful permanent residents, asylees and refugees, and those who are 
inadmissible for reasons other than fraud, misrepresentation, or lack of documents. See 
INA§§ 212(a)(6) and (a)(7), codified at 8 USC § 1182(a)(6) and (a)(7) (2000). The Attorney 
General and DHS have expanded the use of expedited removal in recent years. For a 
description and assessment of expedited removal see TRAC Immigration, Immigration 
Inspections When Arriving in the US, available at <http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/ 
reports/142/> (last visited Feb 22, 2007); Alison Siskin, Immigration Enforcement Within 
the United States, CRS Report for Congress 10 (Apr 6, 2006), available at <http:// 
fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/64931.pdf> (last visited Feb 22, 2007); Kate Jas-
tram and Tala Hartsough, A-File And Record Of Proceeding Analysis Of Expedited Re-
moval, Report on Asylum Seekers in Expedited Removal Volume II, (US Commission on 
International Religious Freedom Feb 8, 2005), available at <http://www.uscirf.gov/ 
countries/global/asylum_refugees/2005/february/index.html> (last visited Feb 23, 2007). 
6 INA§ 240B, codified at 8 USC § 1229c (2000). 
7 See, for example, Lenni B. Benson, Back to the Future: Congress Attacks the Right 
to Judicial Review of Immigration Proceedings, 29 Conn L Rev 1411 (1997). In this article 
I explain some of the normative values preserved by judicial review and describe the 
historical expansions and restrictions on judicial review of immigration decisions. I also 
predicted that attorneys and courts would "constitutionalize" the issues in order to pre-
serve access to judicial review. See also Nancy Morawetz, Back to Back to the Future? 
Lessons Learned from Litigation over the 1996 Restrictions on Judicial Review, 51 NY L 
Sch L Rev 113 (200617) (reexamining the last ten years of litigation over the scope and 
forms of judicial review and in particular the attacks on access to habeas jurisdiction). 
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adapt it as much as possible to their private or institutional in-
terests.s Reformers should pause to consider the likely adapta-
tions and manipulations the actors in the system will promote. 
Only with this attention to the forces within the systems will we 
come closer to achieving any policy goals. 
Finally, I am unconvinced that the increase in judicial re-
view of immigration cases is in fact a critical problem in terms of 
enforcing our immigration laws.9 Bureaucrats and members of 
Congress may tilt their lances at the windmill of judicial review 
and perhaps successfully knock out a few blades weakening the 
mill; but the availability or quantity of judicial review plays a 
small role in the operation of our nation's total enforcement ef-
forts. It is time for Congress to stop eyeing judicial review as part 
of the formula essential to some desired mercury. The absence or 
abundance of judicial review alone will not transmute our immi-
gration laws into a clear and effective method of controlling ad-
mission and residence in this country. Further, I value the role 
our judiciary plays in safeguarding individual rights and execu-
tive compliance with legislative mandates. If I define "there" as a 
sound, effective, efficient and manageable method of judicial re-
view, and characterize "here" as the expensive, time-consuming 
and exponentially expanding reservoir of cases that is our cur-
rent system, to get from ''here" to "there," we must begin with 
close observation of the primary particles that contribute and 
combine and interact to create the current system. 
I. EXPONENTIAL GROWTH IN THE RATE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
It is undisputed that there has been an extraordinary in-
crease in the number of immigration cases in the federal courts. 
8 See, for example, Liu v INS, 475 F3d 135 (2d Cir 2007) (ruling that the court had 
some power to review the agency's determination of whether a claim for asylum was time-
barred). 
9 In fact, judicial review is not listed as one of the obstacles to executing on final 
orders of removal. In a Department of Justice Inspector General study of the enforcement 
rate of final removal orders and the obstacles to their execution, the Department of Jus-
tice did not enumerate judicial review as one of the problems. See Department of Justice, 
Inspector General, The Immigration and Naturalization Service's Removal of Aliens Is-
sued Final Orders Report, Report Number I-2003-004 (Feb 2003), available at 
<http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/reports/INS/e0304/results.htm#rec2> (last visited Feb 23, 
2007). Further, in a study examining several agency actors involved in the enforcement of 
immigration laws, the authors found that declines in removal rates were more likely 
related to delays in the administrative process than to judicial review. In fact, judicial 
review was only briefly analyzed in the entire report. Siskin, Immigration Enforcement at 
10 (cited in note 5). This study comes closer to the type of systemic evaluation I am rec-
ommending than any other government audit or testimony I reviewed. 
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The press and Congress have characterized this growth as un-
manageable, a surge that would overwhelm the dockets of the 
circuit courts. As Chief Judge John Walker noted, "if we continue 
to receive immigration cases at this pace, soon the court's work 
[will] be almost exclusively immigration law."10 
Figure 2 
Immigration and Administrative Review as a 
Portion of the Entire Federal Docket: 2006 
Ill Remainder ofFederal 
Docket 
80.33% 
•Administrative Review 
Non-Immigration 
1.79% 
O Immigration Cases 
17.88% 
Source: Duff, 2006 Annual Report at 115-20 Table B-3 (cited in note 4). 
In reaction to the increased immigration caseload, Congress 
conducted hearings on the current system of review and consid-
ered proposals for streamlining or consolidating judicial review. 
In that testimony, the government reported an increase in the 
rate of appeal to the BIA from 6 percent to 29 percent in the last 
four years, 11 and immigration cases now represent nearly 20 per-
cent of the entire federal courts of appeals docket. 12 
10 John M. Walker, Jr., Keynote Presentation, Seeking Review: Immigration Law and 
Federal Court Jurisdiction Symposium, available at <http://www.nyls.edu/docs/walker% 
20keynote.mp3> (last visited Feb 22, 2007). From 2005 to 2006 the total number in-
creased by ninety cases but the rate increase slowed to 3.5 percent. 
11 Hearing concerning budget and resource needs of the Justice Department Civil 
Division for fiscal year 2007 before the House Subcommittee on Commercial and Admin-
istrative Law, Committee on the Judiciary, 109th Cong (2006) (statement of Peter D. 
Keisler, Assistant Attorney General from the Civil Div of the DOJ), available at 
<http://www.judiciary.house.gov/OversightTestimony.aspx?ID=611> (last visited Feb 26, 
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In some circuits, immigration now represents nearly 40 per-
cent of the entire docket. 13 The images below show the percent-
age of BIA appeals in relation to the total docket of the circuit 
courts in 2005 and 2006.14 
Figure 3A 
2005 Data Comparison of Circuit Courts of Appeals: 
Immigration as a Percentage of Total Docket 
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Source: Duff, 2006 Annual Report at 115-20 Table B-3 (cited in note 4). 
2007). 
l2 As of September 2005, appeals from the BIA to federal court represented 18 per-
cent of the civil appellate docket. There were 12,349 BIA appeals out of 68,473 appeals 
total in the courts of appeals. Leonidas R. Mecham, 2005 Annual Report of the Director 
114 Table B-3 (Administrative Office of the US Courts 2005), available at <http:// 
www.uscourts.gov/judbus2005/appendices/b3.pdf> (last visited Feb 22, 2007). 
l3 In April of 2006, Chief Judge John Walker testified to Congress that the Second 
Circuit had approximately 2,500 immigration cases on its docket. Immigration Litigation 
Reduction, Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Judiciary, 109th Cong, 2d Sess 5 
(2006) (statement of John M. Walker, Chief Judge, US Court of Appeals for the 2d Cir-
cuit), available at <http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=1845&wit_id=5214> (last 
visited May 10, 2007). In 2005, the Second Circuit had 7,035 cases on its docket, which 
means that roughly 35.5 percent of the docket was immigration cases. Mecham, 2005 
Annual Report at 115 Table B-3 (cited in note 12). 
14 Duff, 2006 Annual Report at 115-20 Table B-3 (cited in note 4). 
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Figure 3B 
2006 Data Comparison of Circuit Courts of Appeals: 
Immigration as a Percentage of Total Docket 
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In response to the increase, there have been multiple legisla-
tive proposals to restrict judicial review of immigration decisions, 
most notably in two distinct immigration reform bills passed by 
the House of Representatives and the Senate. In 2006, a House 
bill essentially eliminated judicial review of the denial of natu-
ralization applications, visa revocations, and decisions made by 
consular officials.15 With regard to judicial review of removal or-
ders in particular, the House bill required aliens seeking review 
of such orders to obtain a "certification of reviewability" from one 
federal judge before filing a petition for review with the court of 
appeals. Earlier versions of a Senate bill also required certifi-
cates of reviewability and, in addition, would have consolidated 
all immigration appeals into the Federal Circuit, without ad-
dressing the implications of such a drastic shift. 16 However, after 
15 HR 4437, 109th Cong, 1st Sess (Dec 6, 2005) (2006) (passed the House of Represen-
tatives Dec 16, 2005). 
l6 S 2611 § 701, 109th Cong, 2d Sess (Apr 7, 2006) (introduced by Senator Arlen 
Specter, Chairman, Senate Committee on the Judiciary). For a critique of the certificate 
of reviewability requirement, see Jill E. Family, Stripping Judicial Review during Immi-
gration Reform: The Certificate of Reviewability, (Working Paper Series, April 17, 2007), 
available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=978531> (last visited June 5, 2007). 
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a brief hearing and the testimony of several federal judges, Sena-
tor Arlen Specter and the Judiciary Committee dropped these 
provisions from the bill. 17 Instead, the final Senate legislation 
called for a study by the GA0. 18 The GAO would examine the 
federal appellate process for immigration review, consider vari-
ous options for consolidating or redistributing immigration ap-
peals, and also consider the benefit of procedural proposals such 
as certificates of reviewability. 
More recently, in September 2006, Representative F. James 
Sensenbrenner, Jr., chair of the House Immigration Subcommit-
tee, unsuccessfully attempted to attach three immigration en-
forcement riders to the 2007 Defense Authorization bill. 19 One of 
these bills sought to give the Secretary of the Department of 
Homeland Security authority to indefinitely detain a newly cre-
ated class of "dangerous aliens" who cannot be removed. The bill 
restricted judicial review for this class of cases to habeas corpus 
proceedings initiated in the federal district court in Washington, 
D.C., and only after the exhaustion of all statutory and regula-
tory remedies.20 
Even if one agrees that twelve thousand new immigration 
cases a year is too great a workload for the circuit courts of ap-
peals, the rush to legislative reform is putting composition before 
study. This paper will explain why the existing data are insuffi-
17 Chairman's Mark, EAS 6090 § 707(b) (Feb 24, 2006). For a detailed discussion of 
the Chairman's Mark, see Family, Stripping Immigration Judicial Review at 23-26 (cited 
in note 16). 
l8 S 2611 § 707, 109th Cong, 2d Sess (Apr 7, 2006). The GAO study set forth in the 
Bill required the Comptroller General to consider three methods of consolidating all ap-
peals from the BIA and habeas petitions in immigration cases into one U.S. Court of 
Appeals. Those methods are: (1) consolidating all such appeals into one circuit court, 
including the Federal Circuit; (2) creating a "centralized appellate court" consisting of 
judges from various existing circuits who would sit on the centralized court temporarily; 
and (3) creating a panel of active circuit court judges who would reassign such appeals 
from circuits with relatively high caseloads to those with relatively low caseloads. The 
GAO would consider such factors as the resources needed for each alternative, the impact 
on the various circuits, the possibility of using case management techniques to reduce the 
impact of any consolidation method, the effect of reforms in the INA on the ability of the 
circuits to adjudicate such appeals, the potential impact on litigants, and other reforms to 
improve adjudication of immigration cases. 
19 The bills failed when attached to the Defense Authorization bill, but were repack-
aged and reintroduced days later, and passed in the House. See Border Tunnel Preven-
tion Act of 2006, HR 4830, 109th Cong, 2d Sess (Mar 1, 2006); Community Protection Act 
of 2006, HR 6094, 109th Cong, 2d Sess (Sept 19, 2006); Immigration Law Enforcement 
Act of 2006, HR 6095, 109th Cong, 2d Sess (Sept 19 2006). 
20 Dangerous Aliens Detention Act of 2006, HR 6094 Title I, 109th Cong, 2d Sess 
(Sept 19, 2006). 
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cient to understand the problems in the process and will suggest 
areas of further inquiry. 
II. THE QUALITIES OF THE "HERE"-WHAT JUDICIAL REVIEW OF 
IMMIGRATION ORDERS LOOKS LIKE IN 2007 
Judicial review of a final order of removal21 takes place in 
the court of appeals representing the geographic circuit where 
the immigration removal hearing was held. Immigration hear-
ings are heard first before immigration judges ("IJ s"), adminis-
trative officers serving within the Executive Office of Immigra-
tion Review ("EOIR"), a division of the Department of Justice. IJs 
are under the control and regulation of the Attorney General. 
They do not have the independence of an Article I court. By regu-
lation, the Attorney General has provided a Board of Immigra-
tion Appeals ("BIA") staffed by members appointed by the Attor-
ney General. An immigration removal order becomes final within 
thirty days of the order of the IJ unless the individual perfects an 
appeal to the BIA. 22 
There are over two hundred individual IJs serving through-
out the United States. The geographic distribution appears to 
follow the concentration of noncitizens within the United States, 
with the caveat that the Department of Justice has prioritized 
the placement of judges near immigration detention centers, and 
in some cases, within correctional institutions. More than 50 per-
cent of the EOIR caseload is heard in Texas, California, New 
York and Florida.23 In many states, there is no sitting IJ. In 
some of these states, immigration removal hearings are held via 
videoconference. The IJs who control these videoconference hear-
21 By and large, the current debates in Congress have lumped all judicial review 
involving immigration law together and have not distinguished between or among the 
wide variety of administrative decisions that may be part of one immigration case. This 
confusion over the breadth and scope of the jurisdictional strictures in the current stat-
utes is something that Congress should also consider evaluating and clarifying in new 
legislation. The government has sometimes successfully argued that restrictions on re-
view of removal orders also apply to litigation over administrative decisions in other cases 
involving benefits in the immigration system even when that decision is not in anyway 
part of a removal proceeding. While this article is begging for everyone to recognize com-
plexity in the system and its operation, for purposes of clarity, the discussion is limited to 
judicial review of removal orders. 
22 If the individual did not seek administrative review of the order of removal, the 
federal court might find that the respondent failed to exhaust administrative remedies. 
See 8 CFR § 1003.l(b)(2006) (describing jurisdiction of the Board of Immigration Ap-
peals). 
23 EOIR 2006 Statistical Year Book at 10, Table 1 (cited in note 4) (The workload of 
these courts represent 234,313 of the total workload, or 67 percent.). 
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ings may be in a major city or in the recently established virtual 
courtroom in Northern Virginia where the EOIR is headquar-
tered. 
In 2006, the EOIR reported that the individual IJs handled 
more than 305,000 orders, including more than 299,000 individ-
ual cases. 24 BIA Members and the individual IJ s also rule on mo-
tions to reopen or reconsider immigration proceedings and on 
bond determinations. Moreover, a growing percentage of the 
workload of the BIA is review of matters that were never before 
an IJ, but instead originated from the administrative adjudica-
tions of the Citizenship and Immigration Services, a separate 
bureau within the Department of Homeland Security.25 The 
workload of individual judges varies greatly. In Harlingen and 
San Antonio, Texas, an IJ may dispose of eight thousand cases in 
a year. 26 In other areas the workload may be closer to twelve 
hundred. 
The exact rate of individuals seeking review from an indi-
vidual judge's decision is not easily assessed from the total case 
figures, and the workload in any single year may include cases 
pending from prior years. The EOIR has estimated the rate of 
24 EOIR 2006 Statistical Year Book at C3 (cited in note 4). 
25 The BIA also has responsibility for administrative review of other matters such as 
review of a denial of eligibility for a visa category. For example, if the Citizenship and 
Immigration Service Bureau of the Department of Homeland Security ("CIS") found that 
a husband had not provided sufficient evidence of the legality of his marriage and thereby 
denied that husband's petition for his spouse, the BIA would be the entity that reviewed 
the legal analysis of the CIS. In fiscal year 2005, review of decisions from that CIS ap-
pears to be approximately 4,000 of the 42,000 decisions rendered. See US Department of 
Justice, EOIR, FY 2005 Statistical Year Book S2 (Feb 2006) ("EOIR 2005 Statistical Year 
Book"), available at <http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/statspub/fy05syb.pdf> (last visited Feb 23, 
2007). In fiscal year 2006, the BIA reviewed 6,121 CIS decisions of the total 39,707 deci-
sions rendered. EOIR 2006 Statistical Year Book at S2 (cited in note 4). Review of matters 
not originating in the immigration courts is a growing percentage of the BIA docket. 
Evaluating how this 10 to 15 percent of the BIA workload effects overall resource alloca-
tion would be an important question in assessing the efficiency and process of the BIA. 
Moreover, some of the workload of the Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") 
attorneys who represent the government in removal proceedings before the EOIR are 
initiated by charging documents prepared by supervisors and attorneys within CIS. 
Again, understanding how this division of the Department of Homeland Security can 
affect the priorities and workload of the ICE attorneys and of the courts is an important 
aspect of the total picture and one that I have yet to see publicly reported. 
26 U.S. Government Accountability Office ("GAO"), Report to the Chairman, Commit-
tee on Finance, U.S. Senate, Executive Office for Immigration Review: Caseload Perform-
ance Reporting Needs Improvement 13 (August 2006) ("EOIR GAO Study"), available at 
<http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GA0-06-771> (last visited Feb 22, 2007). As is noted 
in this article, the vast majority of these "cases" are the entry of in absentia orders. The 
government maintains that it can enter such orders even when there is no known address 
for the noncitizen. See INA§ 240(b)(5), codified at 8 USC § 1229a (2000); 8 CFR § 1003.26 
(2007). 
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administrative review for fiscal year 2005 as 12 percent. The 
EOIR data show a slight decline in the rate of appeal from an IJ 
decision, from 14 percent in 2001 to 12 percent in 2005. 27 How-
ever, in 2005 the EOIR also reported an increase in the percent-
age of in absentia orders-these are proceedings where the re-
spondent failed to appear.28 Accordingly, the rate of appeal may 
have dropped because these individuals do not yet know they are 
subject to a final order.29 In the 2006 report, the EOIR explains 
that most of the increase in these in absentia orders occurred in 
Harlingen and San Antonio, Texas, and that the total number of 
orders decreased from 55,893 orders in 2005 to 45,268 in 2006.30 
Still, these two immigration courts accounted for 41 percent of 
the total number of in absentia orders. This is an example of how 
prosecutorial policy can drive the workload of the IJs and later 
the appellate bodies. 31 
The BIA currently has eleven members, a figure that has 
fluctuated over the past ten years. This administrative appellate 
body is supported by professional staff attorneys and administra-
tive staff, both of which have steadily increased in number. 
In the past, all decisions of the BIA were heard in panels of 
at least three judges and few decisions were made en bane. In 
late 1999, the BIA established a pilot program to allow a single 
judge to affirm the order below without writing a new opinion-
the Affirmance Without Opinion ("A WO") program. This A WO 
27 EOIR 2005 Statistical Year Book at Yl (cited in note 25). 
28 In 2005, the EOIR reported a 103 percent rate of increase in orders based on aliens 
who failed to appear. Id at Hl. This huge increase immediately raised the issue of 
whether the government is using a different charging process or bringing more cases to 
the attention of the immigration courts to obtain formal orders of removal, rather than 
informally handling the removal of the noncitizen. In other words, is the government 
refusing to use its informal process known as "voluntary departure" where a letter cita· 
tion is issued and the individual must depart on his own without administrative hear· 
ings? 
29 Id at Yl. 
30 EOIR 2006 Statistical Year Book at Hl (cited in note 4). 
31 The EOIR does not provide a full explanation of the recent increase in the in ab-
sentia orders, but states "The immigration court workload is dependent on the actions 
taken by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The DHS' long standing policy 
known as "catch and release" was designed to release non-Mexican aliens apprehended at 
entry on their own recognizance. This policy resulted from DHS' and the now defunct 
INS' insufficient capacity to detain all aliens apprehended at entry. In recent years, due 
to this policy, the failure to appear rate has increased dramatically at the immigration 
courts. This has caused a subsequent increase in in absentia removal orders being issued 
by the immigration judges. In August 2006, DHS abolished this policy." Id at Hl. There is 
no explanation for why DHS abandoned this approach. This is the type of dynamic inter-
action that needs to be studied to fully understand the workloads of these agencies. 
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program became more formally established in 2002.32 The EOIR 
reported that in fiscal year 2005, less than 20 percent of BIA 
opinions were issued through the AWO method.33 The BIA main-
tains that the AWO program allowed it to eliminate large back-
logs and to keep up with the rate of new appeals from the in-
creased workloads before the individual IJs.34 The total number 
of A WO decisions is not formally or separately reported in the 
statistical yearbooks of the EOIR. 
The EOIR reported that the eleven BIA members issued 
46,355 decisions, including individual cases and motions during 
fiscal year 2005.35 The BIA received 42, 734 orders during that 
same period. 36 
Let us pause to consider the rate of adjudication. Eleven 
members resolved approximately 46,000 matters. Assuming 
there are 220 workdays a year, the eleven members worked 
2,420 days a year and each member produced nineteen decisions 
per day. In an eight-hour work day that is more than 2.375 cases 
per hour. Apparently one in five orders is an AWO, but affir-
mance still requires review of the administrative record. Of 
course, not every decision requires the review of a large tran-
script, accompanying forms and exhibits, but I immediately 
question the quality of decisions made at this rate. 
Unfortunately, the EOIR Year Books report data in five-year 
increments and the written descriptions of the data tend to em-
phasize percentages rather than actual case numbers. The casual 
analyst may be misled by this presentation of the data. For ex-
ample, in the 2005 Year Book, the BIA reported that from 2001 
to 2005, receipts increased 52 percent and completions only in-
creased 46 percent. 37 In the 2006 Year Book, the BIA reported 
32 8 CFR § 1003.l(d)(2), (3) (2006). 
33 US Department of Justice, EOIR, Fact Sheet, BIA Restructuring and Streamlining 
Procedures (revised Mar 9, 2006), available at <http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/press/06/ 
BIAStreamliningFactSheet030906.htm> (last visited Apr 3, 2007). 
34 See id. 
35 EOIR 2005 Statistical Year Book at S2 (cited in note 25). The fiscal year runs from 
October 1 to September 30. The data is gathered and reported as fiscal year reports 
known as Statistical Year Books. 
36 Id. Yet, the BIA reports that the rate of completion is not keeping up with the rate 
of new receipts. More detailed analysis is required if we are to understand if the differen-
tial between the rates of receipts and the rate of completion is resulting in an increased 
backlog or if the rate of increase was sufficient to make a dent in what was once a many 
year backlog. This type of analysis was attempted by the GAO in its study of the EOIR 
caseload but that report did not analyze the BIA caseload. See EOIR GAO Study at 20-23 
(cited in note 26) (examining immigration courts' case completion data). 
37 EOIR 2005 Statistical Year Book at S2 (cited in note 25). ''Receipts" are the appeals 
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that receipts increased 14 percent from 2002-2006 and comple-
tions decreased by 12 percent in that period. The change in the 
relative percentage of completions is enormous: a 58 percent 
spread. Yet no reader of the 2006 Year Book would immediately 
see this difference because of the five-year reporting period. 
What do these numbers tell us? To me, they raise many 
questions that the existing published data fail to answer. Why is 
there an increase in the number of people subjected to proceed-
ings? Why is there a decrease in the number of people seeking 
administrative review? Further, of this smaller group seeking 
administrative review, why was there a spike in the number of 
people seeking federal court review?3S 
Figure 4 
Table Showing Rate of Appeal from IJ Orders to the BIA 
IJ Decisions 
170,222 
197,941 
209,274 
264,792 
273 615 
Case Anneals Received (Aliens) 
25,544 
33,654 
34,164 
30,469 
24 527 
Percent Annealed 
15% 
17% 
16% 
12% 
9% 
Source: EOIR 2006 Statistical Year Book at Yl (cited in note 4). 
To answer these large questions, we must ask many smaller, 
specific questions about the characteristics of the individual 
cases and disaggregate the overall data to identify significant 
causal factors shaping the rate of appeal. For example, we might 
ask what specific grounds of removal are being used by the DHS? 
Are there more people charged with fraud? Are there more peo-
ple charged with a ground of inadmissibility, or are a greater 
number being placed in proceedings rather than in summary 
border procedures? Are more people now subject to removal be-
cause of a criminal conviction?39 Is the 103 percent increase in 
from the IJ decision received by the BIA, and "completions" are the number of appeals 
from IJ decisions resolved by the BIA. 
38 The most recent data indicate that the rate of appeal to federal court is dropping. 
See the large drop in the number of 9th Circuit cases in the table provided above. 
39 It appears that there has been a large increase in DHS reliance on "administrative 
removal" under INA § 238, codified at 8 USC 1228 (2000), which is available when an 
individual has been convicted of an aggravated felony. See TRAC Immigration, New Data 
on the Processing of Aggravated Felons, available at <http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/ 
reports/175/> (last visited Feb 22, 2007). This report, based on analyzing information 
secured under the Freedom of Information Act, documents a large increase in the admin-
istrative form of removal. The Department of Justice also reported on using this proce-
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the entry of in absentia orders reflective of a shift in policy to-
ward a less formal administrative process, away from contested 
administrative proceedings?40 
Figure 5 
2006 In Absentia Orders as a Percentage of IJ Orders 
350,000 
300,000 -
250,000 
II In absentia orders 
200,000 
150,000 o IJ Decisions & Adm in. 
Closures 
100,000 
50,000 
0 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Source: EOIR 2006 Statistical Year Book at H2 (cited in note 4). 
Do rates of appeal suggest any single cause? It could be that 
fewer people are appealing the order of the IJ because they won. 
The BIA has jurisdiction to hear the appeals of either the gov-
ernment or the noncitizen. Is it possible that the government is 
appealing at a lower rate? 
dure. See Department of Justice, Inspector General, Criminal Aliens: The Removal Proc-
ess, Immigration and Naturalization Service Institutional Removal Program Appendix II 
(Sept 2002), available at <http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/reports/INS/a0241/app2.htm> (last 
visited Feb 22, 2007). These case numbers should not be reported within the universe of 
cases before the EOIR and thus should not explain the decrease in administrative ap-
peals. For another report trying to analyze the profile of the people being removed as 
"aggravated felons", see TRAC immigration, How Often Is The Aggravated Felony Statute 
Used?, available at <http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/158/> (last visited Feb 22, 
2007). The report indicates that many of the people facing removal as an "aggravated 
felon" have been resident in the United States for greater than fifteen years. The TRAC 
studies are providing valuable insight into the prosecutorial choices of the DHS and 
should be useful to analyzing priorities and perhaps helpful to Congress in evaluating the 
costs and benefits of expansive grounds of removal such as statutory expansion of the 
term "aggravated felony." 
40 If the government secures an in absentia order, in a sense, it has bypassed a more 
formal proceeding because the noncitizen has failed to appear and the process becomes 
fairly automatic. The resulting order is a binding final order of removal. INA 
§ 240(b)(5)(A), codified at 8 USC § 1229a(b)(5)(A) .. As this article was going to press, the 
EOIR released data for fiscal year 2006. In absentia orders increased from 100,994 to 
102,834, but the rate of failure to appear orders remains steady at 39 percent. See EOIR 
2006 Statistical Year Book at H2 (cited in note 4). 
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In August 2006, the GAO published a report on its investiga-
tion of the workload of the two hundred IJs and the EOIR's ad-
ministrative controls and reporting systems.41 This study de-
scribes the EOIR workload, the manner in which individual 
cases are assigned to individual IJs, and the agency's efforts to 
manage its work through time-to-completion goals.42 The study 
found problems with the data as collected by the EOIR, and un-
der their auditing principles, the GAO could not make conclu-
sions due to the faulty or insufficient data.43 But perhaps more 
instructive is the fact that, for eighteen months, the GAO studied 
the workings of the immigration courts and how the cases were 
completed, but spent almost no time identifying what happens to 
the cases administratively appealed to the BIA or to the cases 
remanded from the federal courts.44 This study did not investi-
gate beyond the IJ level. 
While the study provides very useful information about the 
EOIR's management and performance methods, it does not ex-
plore the dynamics that contributed to those caseloads.45 Nor did 
the study really seek to quantify or examine the origins of the 
EOIR's cases. We can read this study and not know why there 
was a 44 percent increase in the number of new filings, although 
the GAO quotes the EOIR as stating that "EOIR attributes this 
growth in part to enhanced border enforcement activities."46 No-
where in this study does the GAO or EOIR elaborate on this im-
portant issue.47 We do not know if the government's prosecutorial 
priorities have changed, or why the government might use the 
41 EOIR GAO Study (cited in note 26). 
42 Id at 22. 
43 Id at 33. The GAO basically found that the EOIR's explanation for inconsistencies 
in its data and its methods of reporting could not be verified and suggested that in the 
future the EOIR should adopt better reporting systems. Id. 
44 There is one line that says that, "a case remanded from the BIA is usually assigned 
to the immigration judge that had initially adjudicated the case." EOIR GAO Study at 17 
n 27 (cited in note 26). 
45 To be fair, the study was requested by Senator Charles Grassley as Chair of the 
Committee on Finance. The GAO described Senator Grassley's request as an inquiry into 
the performance of the immigration courts. The GAO included three questions: "1. In 
recent years, what has been the trend in immigration courts' caseload? 2. How does OCIJ 
assign and manage immigration court caseload? 3. How does EOIR/OCIJ evaluate the 
immigration courts' performance?" Id at 2. 
46 Id. 
47 By comparing the data to the 2005 EOIR Statistical Year Book, I found that this 
phrase is probably referring to the 103 percent increase in in absentia orders from 47,408 
in 2004 to 100,994 in 2005. See EOIR 2005 Statistical Year Book at H2 (cited in note 25). 
More than half of these orders were issued in two immigration courts, San Antonio and 
Harlingen, Texas. Id at Hl. 
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immigration courts to obtain an order of removal rather than 
informally handling the case. 4s 
Let us explore this more abstractly. We need to move from 
alchemy to science. We need to seriously identify the "right" 
questions before we design solutions. When we are only gather-
ing the data from the statistical reports of the adjudicating 
agency, we miss important characteristics of the situation, such 
as the catalysts that drive the workload of the adjudicators. 
Without knowing the priorities and procedures of the prosecutors 
or understanding the responding behavior of the noncitizens and 
those who assist them, we cannot build a complete understand-
ing of the adjudication process within the agency. Without exam-
ining the time periods for adjudicating cases before the BIA or 
examining whether the cases were originated on appeal by the 
noncitizen or by the Department of Homeland Security,49 we 
cannot gain a complete picture of the administrative process and 
how it contributes to the enforcement of the immigration laws. 
After all, an order of removal is not final until administrative 
review, if sought, is complete.50 These issues will only become 
more abstract when we turn to examine the workload of the fed-
eral courts reviewing the agency decisions. 
Ill. A FIVEFOLD INCREASE IN FEDERAL COURT 
REVIEW OF REMOVAL ORDERS 
The Office of Immigration Litigation ("OIL") is part of the 
Civil Division of the Department of Justice. This office coordi-
nates the representation of the government's position in all of the 
cases seeking judicial review of removal orders. In April 2006, 
Peter J. Keisler, an Assistant Attorney General, asked for in-
creased appropriations to support an expansion of OIL and to 
4s The Department of Homeland Security has statutory authority to remove some 
individuals without administrative court proceedings. For example, some individuals are 
given a right to voluntarily depart and no court proceedings are initiated. See INA 
§ 240B, codified at 8 USC § 1229c (2000). Under INA § 238, codified at 8 USC § 1228 
(2000), individuals may be subject to administrative removal due to a state or federal 
criminal conviction that meets the definition of "aggravated felony" as defined in INA 
§ 101(a)(43), codified at 8 USC § 110l(a)(43) (2000). Others are subject to a form of re-
moval known as "expedited removal" which largely eliminates the involvement of the 
immigration courts. See INA§ 235(b), codified at 8 USC § 1225(b) (2000). 
49 Appeals to the BIA may be brought by either the individual respondent or the 
attorney representing the Immigration and Customs Enforcement Division of the De-
partment of Homeland Security. These attorneys are informally referred to as "ICE trial 
attorneys." As opposed to ICE, the EOIR and the BIA are not part of the Department of 
Homeland Security but are part of the Department of Justice. 
50 See INA§ 242(d)(l), codified at 8 USC § 1252(d)(l) (2000). 
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support the workload of the office.51 He reported that during the 
past four years the rate of appeal from BIA orders had increased 
from 6 percent to 29 percent. The fivefold increase is further 
compounded by an increase in the total number of opinions is-
sued by the BIA. The EOIR used essentially the same figures in 
reporting the rate of review from the BIA.52 Mr. Keisler reported 
that OIL was now handling over 17,000 cases and that each at-
torney in the division had an annual caseload of over 150 peti-
tions for review. 53 
The EOIR reports that it is transmitting the records of more 
than 1,000 cases per month to the courts of appeals. From a com-
parison of the OIL data with the reports of the federal courts on 
the total number of cases seeking review of administrative deci-
sions, it appears that 90 percent of the administrative review 
cases are immigration-related.54 The federal judges charged with 
the adjudication of these petitions for review have not been silent 
and have independently reported to the press and to Congress 
that immigration cases have become a significant proportion of 
their dockets. Chief Judge John Walker, Jr., of the Second Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals has testified that immigration cases make 
up 38 percent of his circuit's workload. Chief Judge Mary 
Schroeder of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reported that 
more than 40 percent of her circuit's docket was immigration-
related. In contrast, petitions for review of immigration matters 
make up a smaller percentage of the total workload of the Fifth, 
Eleventh, and Fourth Circuit. 
51 See generally Statement of Peter J. Keisler (cited in note 11). 
52 EOIR, Fact Sheet, BIA Restructuring (cited in note 33). EOIR reported that the 
rate of new petitions increased from 5 percent to 30 percent between 2002 and 2006. 
53 See Statement of Peter J. Keisler (cited in note 11). Mr. Keisler had reported that 
the traditional caseload was sixty cases a year per attorney in the division. The Office of 
Immigration Litigation has been assigning cases to assistant U.S. attorneys throughout 
the United States so the actual caseload of OIL attorneys is unclear. It is clear that many 
inexperienced government attorneys are now being assigned to these cases. 
54 The Administrative Office of the Federal Courts does report a total number of BIA 
cases pending in all circuits. In 2005, there were 13,713 administrative appeals com-
menced in the courts of appeals; of these, 12,349 were from the BIA. This means in 2005, 
BIA appeals represented 90 percent of the administrative appeals commenced in the 
courts of appeals. See Mecham, 2005 Annual Report at i14 Table B-3 (cited in note 12). 
The numbers did not dramatically change the overall percentage in fiscal year 2006; 
however, the Ninth Circuit reported a drop of 721 cases which reflects an 11 percent 
decline. Duff, 2006 Annual Report at 119 Table B-3 (cited in note 4). 
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IV. WHAT MERCURY GENERATES THE INCREASE IN THE 
RATE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW? 
What might explain a fivefold increase in the number of 
people seeking judicial review of removal orders from 2002 to 
2005? While I am hesitant to present a long list of queries, in-
adequate Congressional hearings and proposed legislation force 
me to pose these critical questions. As I have tried to make clear, 
without the proper investigation we may be unable to under-
stand the dynamics in the system and accordingly cannot solve 
the problems. The critical questions are: Was there a change in 
the substantive law? Was there a change in the BIA's reasoning? 
Was there a change in the quality of representation of nonciti-
zens in immigration proceedings? Were more people able to se-
cure pro bono counsel? Was there a change in the rulings of the 
courts that inspired more people to seek judicial review? Does 
seeking review provide any side benefits to the litigants? Does 
the rate of review correlate with the rate of reversal in the cir-
cuit? Is the rate of review proportional to the volume of cases 
heard within that circuit? Are the contents of the petitions for 
review similar or do some circuits have more appeals concerning 
asylum while others have more appeals contesting a statutory 
interpretation of a ground of removal? 
Again, most of these questions were not presented in recent 
Congressional hearings; nor are they part of the investigatory 
mandate the Senate bill directs to the GAO. In a prior explora-
tion of this topic, I examined some of the questions and began to 
answer them.55 I have not conducted the detailed empirical work 
that would be necessary to substantiate these claims. Still, my 
preliminary investigations lead me to suggest that the largest 
contributing factor in the increase in judicial review is a growth 
in the number of private attorneys willing to prepare a petition 
for review. Attorneys are willing to take on these challenges to 
the administrative review process, despite the narrow scope of 
review and the significant legal issues that are precluded from 
review. Until 1996, many of the immigration appeals reviewed 
55 Lenni B. Benson, Making Paper Dolls: How Restrictions on Judicial Review and 
the Administrative Process Increase Immigration Cases in the Federal Courts, 51 NY L 
Sch L Rev 37 (2006/7). For a perspective which differs dramatically from mine, see Mi-
chael M. Hethmon, Tsunami Watch on the Coast of Bohemia: The BIA Streamlining Re-
forms and Judicial Review of Expulsion Orders, 55 Cath UL Rev 999, 1001 (2006) (argu-
ing that the agency's streamlining regulations have resolved the workload problem at 
that level, and that the federal courts are now faced with their own "administrative cri-
sis"). 
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the denial of relief to a noncitizen under an "abuse of discretion 
standard."56 In 1996, Congress foreclosed direct review for abuse 
of discretion, and yet the caseload continues to grow. Attorneys 
now focus on challenges to the sufficiency of the record and the 
statutory interpretation of eligibility for removal or for relief. 
Judge Jon Newman of the Second Circuit reported that the 
vast majority of the petitions for review in the Second Circuit 
concerned asylum claims.57 Similar characterizations have been 
supported by the empirical studies of John R.B. Palmer.58 Chief 
Judge Mary Schroeder has not reported a similar concentration 
in the Ninth Circuit. OIL handles all of the litigation but has not 
released information regarding the noncitizens' countries of na-
tionality or the nature of the claims being adjudicated in the fed-
eral courts. OIL representatives have testified that the overall 
rate of affirmance of the BIA's orders of removal is 90 percent. 59 
Another apparent factor in the rate of judicial review is the 
role of the government attorneys in prosecuting removal cases. If 
the government seeks to deport an individual from a country 
with known political turmoil or high rates of asylum applicants, 
or if the government chooses to seek removal of a long-term resi-
dent because of a criminal conviction, it is likely that the nonciti-
zen will be motivated to fight his or her removal. Congress has 
preserved avenues of relief from removal for many of these indi-
viduals. Many critics of the removal system have wondered about 
the failure to impose limits, such as statutes of limitations, on 
56 See Peter Schuck and Theodore Hsien Wang, Continuity and Change: Patterns of 
Immigration Litigation in the Courts, 1979-1990, 45 Stan L Rev 115, 155 (1992) (discuss· 
ing the prevalence of "pattern or practice of abuse" lawsuits); Daniel Kanstroom, The 
Better Part of Valor: The REAL ID Act, Discretion, and the ''Rule" of Immigration Law, 51 
NY L Sch L Rev 161, 167-80 (200617) (tracing the historical tension between "discretion" 
and "authority" in immigration law). 
57 Immigration Litigation Reduction, Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Judi-
ciary, 109th Cong, 2d Sess 4 (2006) (statement of Jon Newman, Circuit Judge, US Court 
of Appeals for the 2d Circuit), available at <http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id= 
1845&wit_id=5211> (last visited May 10, 2007). 
58 See John R.B. Palmer, The Second Circuit's "New Asylum Seekers''.· Responses to an 
Expanded Immigration Docket, 55 Cath UL Rev 965 (2006) (discussing the Second Cir-
cuit's response to the dramatic increase in its immigration-related caseload); John R.B. 
Palmer, Steven W. Yale-Loehr, and Elizabeth Cronin, Why Are So Many People Challeng-
ing Board of Immigration Appeals Decisions in Federal Court? An Empirical Analysis of 
the Recent Surge in Petitions for Review, 20 Georgetown lmmig L J 1 (2005). 
59 Statement of Peter J. Keisler (cited in note 11). Mr. Keisler stated the success rate 
was about 90 percent in response to a question after his formal statement was given. The 
transcript for the hearing is available at <http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/ 
judiciary/hju27226.000/hju27226_0f.htm> (last visited June 5, 2007). 
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the ability of the government to seek removal and have proposed 
bars to retroactivity and formal limits.60 
Beyond the failure to use prosecutorial discretion, another 
major contributor to the growing workload is the failure of the 
government attorneys and the IJs to identify and correct prob-
lems in the administrative process. This failure is undoubtedly 
due to individual workload pressures, but should not be ig-
nored. 61 John R.B. Palmer has similarly observed and reported 
on a change in attorney behavior.62 Obviously, these questions 
require detailed examination of case records and interviews with 
the attorneys for the conclusions to be more fully developed, but 
in none of the current government studies have I seen a focus on 
the motivations and reasoning of the key actors: the attorneys. 
Without examining these "dynamic forces" in the system, our 
assessments are bound to be incomplete and static. 
Failure in the administrative process is also due to a lack of 
institutional capacity to learn from the errors of the adjudication 
process identified during judicial review. In 2006, for the first 
time, the EOIR identified the number of cases remanded to the 
agency after federal court review. In the 2005 Statistical Year 
Book, the BIA reports that of the 42, 734 orders handled by the 
agency, 1,308 were handled following remand from the federal 
courts. The report provides no additional detail about what type 
of cases were remanded; nor was any ground for remand identi-
60 See, for example, Margaret H. Taylor and Alexander Aleinikoff, Deportation of 
Criminal Aliens: A Geopolitical Perspective, Washington DC (Inter-American Dialogue, 
1998); Nancy Morawetz, Rethinking Retroactive Deportation Laws and the Due Process 
Clause, 73 NYU L Rev 97, 157 (1998) (arguing for limitations on retroactive application); 
Robert Pauw, A New Look at Deportation as Punishment: Why at Least Some of the Con-
stitution's Criminal Procedure Protections Must Apply, 52 Admin L Rev 305, 337-45 
(2000) (examining the legal effects of conceptualizing deportation as "punishment"); Bill 
0. Hing, Detention to Deportation: Rethinking Removal of Cambodian Refugees, 38 UC 
Davis L Rev 891, 957-69 (2005) (critiquing under principles of relational justice the ex-
pulsion of Cambodian refugees after lifetime residences in the Untied States). See also 
Hiroshi Motomura, Americans in Waiting: The Lost Story of Immigration and Citizenship 
in the United States (Oxford, 2006), for a discussion of the legal development of the con-
cept of permanent residence and how that status became more vulnerable to termination. 
6l In a recently published article, Judge John T. Noonan of the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals illustrates this issue very clearly by including excerpts from the administrative 
hearing transcripts where both the Immigration Judge and the government attorney are 
driven to meet production goals that result in error in the administrative process. See 
John T. Noonan, Symposium on Immigration Appeals and Judicial Review: Immigration 
Law 2006, 55 Cath U L Rev 905, 907-12 (2006). Judge Noonan also observes that the 
government generally fails to exercise discretion regarding the appeal or defense of immi-
gration decisions. Id at 913. 
62 See John R.B. Palmer, The Nature and Causes of the Immigration Surge in the 
Federal Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary Analysis, 51 NY L Sch L Rev 13, 26-32 (2006-
2007) (discussing the potential causes for this shift in attorney behavior). 
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fied. In a prior paper, I interviewed some internal staff of the 
BIA who stated that there was no formal reporting system to the 
staff attorneys about the nature or reason for the remands.63 
Unless one of the hundred-plus staff attorneys happened to be 
reassigned to the remanded case or the case was selected for dis-
cussion by the administration, there was no direct communica-
tion between the federal court and the individuals most respon-
sible for the administrative order. Of course, we might assume 
that all eleven Members of the BIA read the 1,308 remanded 
cases, but that would be a great burden given their large work-
loads and their rates of production.64 
In October of 2005, the Second Circuit increased its monthly 
production of opinions in asylum cases. In March of 2006, the 
Second Circuit began to name the individual IJs in the upper 
right-hand corner of the slip opinion filed on the court website.65 
Moreover, more opinions began to name the particular IJ. 66 This 
is a stark break from a long tradition in judicial review of immi-
gration agency decisions, yet a welcome one in my view. Not only 
does this change result in greater transparency with respect to 
the adjudication process as a whole, but it facilitates feedback 
and may aid in evaluating IJ performance. 67 
V. WHAT (OR WHO) MIGHT BE 
CONTRIBUTING TO THE PHENOMENON? 
The EOIR requires attorneys and accredited representatives 
to file a notice of appearance with the IJ and in BIA proceedings. 
Accordingly, the agency now reports the percentage of cases in-
volving noncitizens with representation. 68 The federal courts 
63 Benson, 51 NY L Sch L Rev at 63 (cited in note 55). 
64 It is not clear how many of the 1,308 cases were remanded after judicial opinion 
and what number were remanded with the stipulated consent of the government counsel. 
In past studies, analysts have found a high rate of remand by stipulation. See Benson, 51 
NY L Sch L Rev at 61-62 (cited in note 55) (citing City Bar Association study reporting 
that 60 percent of Second Circuit appeals that were conferenced were settled or re· 
mantled). 
65 Email from Elizabeth Cronin, Staff Attorney at the Second Circuit, to author (Feb 
7, 2007) (on file with author). 
66 See, for example, Wang u Attorney General, 423 F3d 260 (3d Cir 2005). This case 
and others are discussed in Christine B. LaBrie, Third Circuit Describes ''Disturbing 
Pattern of IJ Misconduct" In Asylum Cases, Immig Daily, available at <http:// 
www.ilw.com/articles/2005,1027·labrie.shtm> (last visited May 10, 2007). 
67 The practice of naming IJs on Second Circuit opinions originated from a suggestion 
from some IJs who wanted to read the orders and link them to their cases. See Cronin 
(cited in note 65). 
68 In 2004, 45 percent of individuals in removal proceedings were represented by 
428 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [2007: 
similarly require formal entry of appearance and have electronic 
databases that would permit analysis of who is representing the 
noncitizens in the immigration cases. Further empirical study 
should be possible to correlate the data and allow an assessment 
of who is representing the noncitizens at the various stages. 
In the Second Circuit, in an effort to understand the nature 
of the surge in immigration appeals, court staff analyzed a sam-
ple of the BIA cases before the court and found that most con-
cerned asylum claims.69 They reported that most of these in-
volved noncitizens challenging the decision of the agency by ar-
guing that the decision was not supported by "substantial evi-
dence." According to Judge Jon Newman, few of the cases were 
presenting novel legal issues such as the nature of "persecution" 
covered by the statutory refugee protections; rather, the vast ma-
jority of cases involved a challenge to the IJ's credibility find-
ing. 70 This analysis similarly found that a small number of attor-
neys represented the majority of the petitioners. 71 I do not have 
access to the exact numbers, but in a few meetings, the court 
personnel suggested that twenty or thirty attorneys represented 
more than half of the forty-eight hundred pending cases. I inter-
viewed several of the high-volume filers. Many responded that 
they had more than 150 cases pending in the Second Circuit and 
in various stages of briefing. When I asked these attorneys how 
they could handle the volume, they reported that most of the 
cases presented the same legal issues and that the bulk of their 
time was spent combing the factual records for errors and lapses 
in the findings of the IJ that might lead to a remand for more 
specific findings. 72 Several of these attorneys reported that they 
won about half of their appeals, and therefore they encouraged 
clients to pursue federal court review. 
My investigation of attorneys appearing in the Second Cir-
cuit was limited. I interviewed fewer than fifteen, and the Second 
Circuit has not published detailed statistics concerning its own 
caseload or the specifics of attorney representation. We need 
counsel; in 2005, only 35 percent were represented. EOIR 2005 Statistical Year Book at 
Gl (cited in note 25). 
69 Palmer, Yale-Loehr and Cronin, 20 Georgetown Immig L J at 71-73 (cited in note 
58). 
70 Immigration Litigation Reduction (statement of Jon Newman) at 10 (cited in note 
57). 
71 See data gathered by John R.B. Palmer. Palmer, 51 NY L Sch L Rev at 31 (cited in 
note 62). 
72 Notes of the emails and phone interviews, all of which were conducted in the fall of 
2005, are on file with the author. 
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more information about the motivation and experiences of the 
attorneys on both sides of the litigation before we reach conclu-
sions about the expectations of the litigants. 
VI. Do WE NEED TO TRANSMUTE THIS 
LEADEN SYSTEM INTO A GOLDEN ONE? 
As discussed in the introduction, I am skeptical about the 
need to transform the judicial review of immigration cases. To 
extend the metaphor, it might indeed be possible to transmute 
lead into gold by exerting vast amounts of energy to strip elec-
trons from the atoms of lead, but the cost of that stripping would 
outpace the economic value of the gold produced. Is there even 
anything fundamentally wrong with our current system of judi-
cial review that justifies expending such energy? As we should 
desire a valuable end product-a just and effective immigration 
system-we should be looking to reform the agency adjudication 
system instead. 
Again, we need to evaluate in a larger context. As I men-
tioned above, one analysis of immigration enforcement did not 
mention judicial review as an obstacle to government enforce-
ment. 73 One way we might evaluate whether the immigration 
system is producing too many appeals is to compare it to the 
rates of appeal in other administrative law systems. While there 
is no easy or direct comparison of systems that would contain all 
the same variables, I found some basic comparisons helpful in 
answering the question of whether the immigration caseload is 
really out of line. 
In a recent comprehensive study of the judicial review of So-
cial Security claims, Paul Verkuil and Jeffrey Lubbers reported 
that the number of Social Security claims subjected to judicial 
review was increasing and could be expected to continue increas-
ing due to the aging population and other factors. 74 This study 
provides a good model of issues to consider in selecting the forum 
73 See Department of Justice, Inspector General, The Immigration (cited in note 9). 
Further, as I have explained in some depth in other papers, the current statute does not 
preclude removal of the individual after an administratively final removal order, rather 
in many districts it is government policy to wait for the exhaustion of judicial review 
rather than a statutory mandate that the government wait. See Benson, 51 NY L Sch L 
Rev at 68-70 (cited in note 55). 
74 Paul R. Verkuil and Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Alternative Approaches to Judicial Review 
of Social Security Disability Cases, 55 Admin L Rev 731, 733-34 (2003). This article was 
based on a study commissioned by the Social Security Advisory Board. Although that 
study did not review the administrative process directly it was clearly prepared with a 
strong understanding of the practice and procedures of the administrative study. 
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and structure of judicial review. While the two administrative 
systems have many distinctions, for now, let's compare a few ap-
ples and oranges. 
The Social Security system handled approximately 507,010 
claims in fiscal year 2000 and, in that same year, the agency 
completed administrative review of approximately 100,950 cases. 
In fiscal year 2001, the federal district courts heard 12,464 Social 
Security cases. 75 In that same year, immigration cases numbered 
l, 760 and the rate of appeal would have been lower than the So-
cial Security appeals. 76 Today, the rate of immigration appeals is 
higher. Neither system underwent major structural changes dur-
ing this time period, so why are the rates of appeal advancing in 
immigration but not in the Social Security system? This one 
comparison alone suggests that it is not the structure and form of 
judicial review that drives the rate of appeal and suggests even 
greater reason for Congress to pause before reforming the cur-
rent system. 
As noted above, it may be that noncitizens seek review be-
cause they have so much at stake. Without knowing more about 
the rate of successful appeals, it is unclear if they are motivated 
by reality. There are no published data reporting on the rates of 
remand in each of the circuit courts of appeals. 77 The Social Se-
curity Administration has traditionally been reversed by the dis-
trict courts in nearly half of the cases. 78 This rate of reversal 
might sustain a high rate of appeal. We can speculate about mo-
tive-the government argues delay of removal, the attorneys 
may argue vindication of statutory and procedural rights that 
have high stakes due to the collateral consequences of removal-
but without a study of the cases, we are only speculating. To take 
corrective action, we need to identify the problem. 
75 Obviously there is a not a direct line here. A case could be heard by the social secu-
rity administration and take more than a year to work through the administrative sys-
tem. 
76 Mecham, 2005 Annual Report at 114 Table B-3 (cited in note 12). 
77 While there are different rough estimates of current remand (meaning at least a 
partial victory for the noncitizen) the rates in some circuits are between 17 percent and 
40 percent. Chief Judge John Walker of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals testified that 
the remand rate in that circuit is 20 percent. Immigration Litigation Reduction (state-
ment of John M. Walker) at 5 (cited in note 13). See also Riki King, Ten Things I Wish I 
Knew Before Filing a Petition for Review in the Second Circuit (May 14, 2006) (unpub-
lished paper) (on file with author). Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals has stated that the remand rate for immigration cases in that circuit is 40 per-
cent. Letter from Richard A. Posner, Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit, to Richard J. Durbin, United States Senator (Mar 15, 2006). 
78 Verkuil and Lubbers, 55 Admin L Rev at 741 (cited in note 74). 
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Perhaps it is the agencies I chose, but it appears by the 
rough comparison that while there is a higher rate of immigra-
tion appeals in the most recent year, the Social Security Admini-
stration has faced a much higher rate of appeal in past years. We 
can examine another agency, one also studied in the Verkuil and 
Lubbers report, the Veterans Benefits system. In that system, 
regional offices decided 598,500 decisions on disability compensa-
tion in 2004, and after a regional appeals process, about 38,600 
applicants submitted formal administrative appeals to the Board 
of Veteran's Appeals ("BVA"). 79 In 2004, the BVA remanded 
about 58 percent of those cases back to the regional offices to be 
reworked, and affirmed the denial of all benefits in 23 percent of 
the cases.80 Given this high remand rate and relatively low de-
nial rate, it is not particularly surprising that only 2,234 cases 
were appealed from the BVA to the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
Veterans' Claims.81 The rate of remand from the BVA may indi-
cate that judicial review is less often necessary because errors 
are caught at the administrative level. The new increase in judi-
cial review of immigration decisions may reflect a temporary 
swell or longer-term movement towards a rate similar to other 
benefits agencies. Certainly, a deeper inquiry into the forms of 
review, the legal issues presented for review, and the internal 
remands from the administrative level might provide a more con-
textualized assessment of the relative merits of the immigration 
system. 
Further, judicial review may have its own efficiency value 
when it is evaluated in context. For example, in the past few 
years the Supreme Court has decided a number of cases inter-
preting the statutory definition of "aggravated felony."82 Remov-
79 GAO, VA Disability Benefits: Board of Veterans' Appeals has Made Improvements 
in Quality Assurance, but Challenges Remain for VA in Assuring Consistency 3 (state-
ment of Cynthia A Bascetta) (May 5, 2005), available at <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ 
d05655t.pdf> (last visited Feb 25, 2007). 
80 Id at 5. 
8l United States Court of Appeals for Veterans' Claims, Annual Report, available at 
<http://www.vetapp.uscourts.gov/documents/Annual_Reports.pdf> (last visited Feb 25, 
2007). 
82 See INA § 101(a)(43), codified at 8 USC § 1101(a)(43) (2000). See, for example, 
Gonzales v Duenas-Alvarez, 127 S Ct 815 (2007) (allowing removal of an alien for a theft 
offense for which term of imprisonment is over one year); Lopez v Gonzales, 127 S Ct 625 
(2006) (Mere possession of narcotics does not rise to the level of illicit trafficking which 
would classify as an aggravated felony.); Leocal v Ashcroft, 543 US 1 (2004) (Negligent 
operation of a motor vehicle was found not to trigger§ 1101 because the statute contem-
plates violent crimes that require a greater intent.). The Supreme Court has also recog-
nized that many cases regarding aggravated felonies are affected by these decisions; for 
example, the Court has granted certiorari in order to remand multiple cases in light of 
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ing criminal aliens is a top priority of both Congress and the 
agencies charged with enforcing the immigration laws; unfortu-
nately, Congress has attempted to direct the agencies with the 
rough term of art "aggravated felony." While the government 
may at times believe the statute is clear, in truth, it requires a 
great deal of interpretation. If an individual meets the threshold 
of having been convicted of an "aggravated felony," the conse-
quences for the agency's enforcement approach are dramatic. In 
some cases, the statute authorizes, and the agency may seek, a 
form of administrative removal that bypasses the immigration 
courts altogether.83 This type of removal order represents a ma-
jority of all removal orders, yet these administrative removals, 
which do not even involve an IJ, do not appear to be part of the 
contemporary debate on the immigration caseload. This is an 
unexplored body of cases, whose gravitational impact on the total 
caseload is unknown and unexplored. Another consequence of 
administrative removal is the preclusion of most avenues of relief 
from removal. Judicial review in this area, as well as a clearer 
statute, would allow for more predictability of immigration con-
sequences. Many individuals seek neither administrative review 
nor judicial review because the aggravated felony conviction has 
eliminated relief. 
Even when judicial review is performed by the circuit courts 
of appeals rather than the Supreme Court, there are benefits 
such as greater clarity in the changing strategies of the agency 
prosecutors, the procedural behaviors of the IJs, and the institu-
tional reforms of the administrative process. When courts refine 
the interpretive tools for applying statutes and implementing 
procedures, they provide guidance to the agency prosecutors and 
to the administrative officials. This conversation between the 
courts and the agencies can help answer the open questions and 
thus help the system operate more effectively. 
Lopez. See, for example, Tostado-Tostado v Carlson, 127 S Ct 936 (2007); Riascos-Cuenu v 
United States, 127 S Ct 827 (2006); Prones v United States, 127 S Ct 826 (2006). 
83 See INA § 238, codified at 8 USC § 1228 (2000) (expedited removal of aliens con-
victed of aggravated felonies). One recent report noted that in 2002, 43 percent of all 
removal orders were issued administratively, as opposed to by an immigration judge. By 
2006, approximately 55 percent of all removal orders were administrative orders. See 
TRAC Immigration, New Data on the Processing of Aggravated Felons, available at 
<http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/175/> (last visited Feb 22, 2007). INA§ 238 theo-
retically preserves the right to judicial review, by requiring the government to wait 14 
days before executing a final order of removal in order to allow the alien to seek review 
under INA § 242, codified at 8 USC § 1252 (2000). However, it appears that there are 
relatively few appeals of removal orders issued under INA § 238. 
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Of course, judicial review, while refining precision and pre-
dictability in statutory interpretation, does not necessarily mean 
that the collateral consequences will always be a net efficiency. A 
single judicial opinion may have collateral effects in both direc-
tions. For some individuals, it will mean a streamlined removal, 
while for others, it will mean that attorneys will have to take the 
case all the way to the judicial review stage in order to refine the 
statutory application or to distinguish the existing precedent. 
Rather than Congress focusing on the availability and form of 
judicial review, this single example suggests to me that a sys-
temic study of the impact of the concept of ''bright line" catego-
ries such as "aggravated felony" on the agencies' enforcement 
efforts would be a more effective way to evaluate how to reach 
Congressional goals. Suppose Congress had introduced the con-
cept of "aggravated felony," not as a bar to relief from removal, 
but as a factor for the agency to consider when determining 
whether to seek removal and for the IJs to consider as a factor in 
a totality of circumstances approach to relief from removal. It is 
possible that the government might not initiate a case when the 
noncitizen is highly motivated to litigate given the equities of 
that person's circumstances, or when the IJ's decision might be 
more difficult to overturn because of the current statutory pre-
clusion barring judicial review of many discretionary exercises. 
It is not judicial review that is really interfering with the op-
eration of the system, but as judicial review is and must be part 
of the system, 84 judicial review needs to be carefully assessed to 
understand how it affects performance within the dynamics of 
the system. 
VII. To FIND THE DYNAMIC FORCES-EVALUATE THE SYSTEM, 
NOT MERELY THE COMPONENTS 
Several of the past studies concerning the immigration re-
moval system provide significant details about its component 
84 At times Congress has tried to eliminate all judicial review of categories of immi-
gration decisions. These attempts have largely not succeeded in the sense that there are 
more cases in the courts than ever before, but they also have not succeeded because there 
are too many legitimate strategies and constitutionally mandated forms of review to 
really ever eliminate the role of the courts. See Benson, 29 Conn L Rev at 1484-94 (cited 
in note 7); Morawetz, 51 NY L Sch L Rev at 120-9 (cited in note 7); Gerald L. Neuman, 
On the Adequacy of Direct Review After the REAL ID Act of 2005, 51 NY L Sch L Rev 133, 
142-53 (2006/7). More importantly, government enforcement frequently benefits from the 
clarifying role of judicial review and it would be foolish to assume that the system might 
be more responsive to congressional values if judicial review were not part of the total 
system. 
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parts but few insights about the interactions of these compo-
nents. For example, in spring 2006, the GAO completed an eight-
een-month study of the EOIR's operations.B5 This study does not 
inquire into the government's prosecutorial priorities with re-
spect to initiating these proceedings; nor does it look at the re-
mand rates after administrative or judicial review of IJ deci-
sions.B6 Similarly, the Attorney General, responding to judicial 
and public criticism of the operations of the immigration courts, 
ordered an internal review of the operations of the EOIR and the 
BIA. B7 This internal review resulted in new recommendations for 
evaluating the performance of the IJs and in proposals for 
greater flexibility in the appointment of BIA Members.BB As this 
review was, by design, internal to the Department of Justice, it 
did not evaluate the interactions with the Department of Home-
land Security, which initiates the removal proceedings; nor did 
the study evaluate the impact of judicial review on rates of re-
mand or on decisions of OIL or other attorneys within the De-
partment of Justice to stipulate to remand. These isolated 
evaluations are informative but not diagnostic. 
It falls to Congress to think beyond the parochial concerns of 
a particular agency and to the interactions of the various actors 
and institutions. Unfortunately, Congress appears willing to con-
tinue taking a linear or narrow approach to analyzing the issues. 
In spring 2006, the Senate passed legislation instructing the 
GAO to study the increasing rate of judicial review. As is fre-
quently the case, the legislation identified several questions and, 
unfortunately, the narrow form of the questions is an example of 
the wrong approach to understanding the role of judicial review 
in immigration removal proceedings. The GAO and other gov-
ernmental auditing institutions are limited by budgetary re-
sources, political constraints, and the Generally Accepted Gov-
ernmental Accounting Standards to perform the audit re-
85 For their results, see EOIR GAO Study (cited in note 26). 
86 The study was prepared in response to a query from the Senate Finance Commit-
tee and the study faults internal reporting systems of the courts which make evaluation 
of the overall performance of the court system difficult. 
87 Gonzales's recommendations/press release is available at <http://www.usdoj.gov/ 
opa/pr/2006/August/06_ag_520.html> (last visited Feb 27, 2007). See also Nina Bernstein, 
Immigration Judges Facing Yearly Performance Reviews, NY Times Section A14 (Aug 10, 
2006). 
88 See Board of Immigration Appeals: Composition of Board and Temporary Board 
Members, Interim Rule with Request for Comments, 71 Fed Reg 70855 (2006) (providing 
these recommendations). 
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quested. 89 The form of the study mandated by that legislation is 
the equivalent of Newton hunting for the mercury to shape lead 
into gold. While we need to know more about the content and 
form of the elements that comprise the immigration removal sys-
tem, without also assessing the forces that work upon those ele-
ments, we won't fully understand the dynamics of the system 
and will likely waste significant energy in a transmutation proc-
ess that will fail or miss the mark. A two-dimensional description 
of the numbers and volume without comparative analysis and 
assessment of contributing forces is inherently insufficient and 
clumsy. It becomes very hard to get "there" when we don't know 
more about the ''here." 
Here is an excerpt from the legislation90 describing the GAO 
study: 
SEC. 707. GAO STUDY ON THE APPELLATE 
PROCESS FOR IMMIGRATION APPEALS. 
(a) In General. The Comptroller General of the United 
States shall, not later than 180 days after enactment 
of this Act, conduct a study on the appellate process 
for immigration appeals. 
(b) Requirements. In conducting the study under sub-
section (a), the Comptroller General shall consider the 
possibility of consolidating all appeals from the Board 
of Immigration Appeals and habeas corpus petitions 
in immigration cases into 1 United States Court of 
Appeals, by-
(1) consolidating all such appeals into an existing 
circuit court, such as the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit; 
89 See Government Auditing Standards, GA0-07-126G, available at <http:// 
www.gao.gov/govaud/d07162g.pdf> (last visited Feb 27, 2007). This book is sometimes 
referred to as the GAGAS or the Yellowbook. In particular examine the standards for 
performance audits found in Chapter 7 of the Yellowbook. While these standards do not 
directly suggest the type of dynamic or systemic analysis I am describing, there are as-
pects of the performance audit standards that indicate that the auditors should try to 
identify obstacles to performance and make recommendations for improving performance. 
They also suggest that the audit itself should involve a dialogue between the auditors and 
internal agency experts and external exports or constituencies engaged in the work of the 
agencies. See, for example, Standards 1.25-1.32 defining performance audits. 
90 S 2611 § 701, 109th Cong, 2d Sess (Apr 7, 2006). 
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(2) consolidating all such appeals into a centralized 
appellate court consisting of active circuit court 
judges temporarily assigned from the various cir-
cuits, in a manner similar to the Foreign Intelli-
gence Surveillance Court or the Temporary Emer-
gency Court of Appeals; or 
(3) implementing a mechanism by which a panel of 
active circuit court judges shall have the authority 
to reassign such appeals from circuits with rela-
tively high caseloads to circuits with relatively low 
caseloads. 
[2007: 
(c) Factors To Consider. In conducting the study under 
subsection (a), the Comptroller General, in consulta-
tion with the Attorney General, the Secretary, and the 
Judicial Conference of the United States, shall con-
sider-
(1) the resources needed for each alternative, in-
cluding judges, attorneys and other support staff, 
case management techniques including technologi-
cal requirements, physical infrastructure, and 
other procedural and logistical issues as appropri-
ate; 
(2) the impact of each plan on various circuits, in-
cluding their caseload in general and caseload per 
panel; 
(3) the possibility of utilizing case management 
techniques to reduce the impact of any consolida-
tion option, such as requiring certificates of re-
viewability, similar to procedures for habeas and 
existing summary dismissal procedures in local 
rules of the courts of appeals; 
( 4) the effect of reforms in this Act on the ability of 
the circuit courts to adjudicate such appeals; 
(5) potential impact, if any, on litigants; and 
(6) other reforms to improve adjudication of immi-
gration matters, including appellate review of mo-
tions to reopen and reconsider, and attorney fee 
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awards with respect to review of final orders of 
removal. 
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Even a casual reader of this legislation can see that the 
study commissioned is predetermined to focus on the functioning 
of the courts and how to channel cases once they are in the judi-
cial review system, rather than an assessment of the charging 
process, administrative hearings, or internal administrative re-
view procedures.91 
Unfortunately, there is a long history of requesting narrow 
studies from the GAO. A review of the GAO's online database for 
all reports and testimony that included the term "immigration" 
in the subject, title, or abstract returned 4 77 results.92 Despite 
the vast number of studies and amount of information compiled, 
each study has addressed a narrow issue such as missing alien 
files, 93 border security and the visa waiver program,94 deaths at 
the border,95 information technology infrastructure,96 or control 
of benefit fraud. 97 The GAO has the power to interview agency 
91 As this article was being finalized, a new comprehensive immigration reform bill 
was introduced into the House of Representatives. See Security Through Regularized 
Immigration and a Vibrant Economy (STRIVE) Act of 2007, HR 1645, 110th Cong, 1st 
Sess (Mar 22, 2007). This bipartisan bill called the "Strive Act" contains a similar provi-
sion mandating a study of the "appellate process", however, the bill selects the Federal 
Judicial Center as the investigator, not the GAO. Strive Act § 703(a). The Federal Judi-
cial Center is a government agency designed to "promote improvements in judicial ad-
ministration in the courts of the United States." Federal Judicial Center homepage, 
available online at <http://www.fjc.gov/> (last visited June 6, 2007). While the Federal 
Judicial Center may be experienced in evaluating workflows in the federal courts, one of 
the major critiques in this paper is that unless the investigations are comprehensive and 
look at the many factors that are shaping the ultimate workloads of the courts, Congress 
is unlikely to obtain sufficient information to fully understand the nature of the problems 
to be solved. While other aspects of the Strive Act appear to recognize the lack of re-
sources in the administrative adjudication system, the actual direction of the study is 
narrow in that the bill specifically directs the study to consider consolidation of all appel-
late review into a single federal court of appeals. See Strive Act § 703(b). The factors 
identified are nearly identical to those in the Senate bill discussed in the text above. 
92 All GAO studies are available at <http://www.gao.gov/docsearch/repandtest.html> 
(last visited Feb 27, 2007). 
93 GAO, Immigration Benefits, Additional Efforts Needed to Help Ensure Alien Files 
are Located When Needed (October 2006). 
94 GAO, Border Security, Stronger Actions Needed to Assess and Mitigate Risks of the 
Visa Waiver Program (July 2006). 
95 GAO, fllegal Immigration, Border-Crossing Deaths Have Doubled Since 1995; 
Border Patrol's Efforts to Prevent Deaths Have Not Been Fully Evaluated (August 2006). 
96 GAO, Information Technology, Immigration and Customs Enforcement is Begin-
ning to Address Infrastructure Modernization Program Weaknesses but Key Improvements 
Still Needed (July 2006). 
97 GAO, Immigration Benefits, Additional Controls and a Sanctions Strategy Could 
Enhance DHS's Ability to Control Benefit Fraud (March 2006). 
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officials, to examine internal data, to consult with consumers and 
other constituencies, to hire experts, and to closely observe ad-
ministrative processes.98 The data offered in these reports often 
represents the most comprehensive information gathered on any 
particular subject. However, these studies result in gathering 
vast amounts of empirical data that is useful only if the audit 
and assessment of the information is sufficiently broad. As previ-
ously described, in August 2006, the GAO completed an eighteen-
month study of the operation of the immigration courts under the 
EOIR's administration.99 The GAO gathered detailed caseload 
statistics, including the workload reports of the IJs and their 
staffs,100 the number and type of pending cases,101 and perform-
ance evaluation methods. 102 The GAO also noted the gaps in the 
information available to it. 103 With this information, and after 
consulting groups that interact with the EOIR, 104 the study 
weakly concluded that the data collection methods of the EOIR 
were problematic and that EOIR reports needed clarification.105 
Given the GAO's capacity to assemble comprehensive data, 
surely the GAO can conduct a more comprehensive and applied 
analysis of the data. Perhaps politics intervened to narrow the 
scope of the report, for during the last six months of the GAO 
study, Attorney General Gonzales ordered the Office of the In-
spector General of the Department of Justice to undertake a re-
view of the IJs' performance as well. 106 Perhaps knowing that the 
DOJ was acting internally, the GAO gracefully backed away 
from more concrete recommendations. Still, this study is a prime 
example of only examining one step in a multi-step process. Yes, 
the EOIR needed evaluation, but we cannot really conclude a 
great deal from this study. The study failed to evaluate how ad-
98 See, for example, EOIR GAO Study at Appendix I (cited in note 26) (describing 
GAO's research methods). 
99 See EOIR GAO Study (cited in note 26). 
100 Id at 6. 
101 Id at 16. 
102 Id at 21. 
103 See EOIR GAO Study at 30 (cited in note 26). 
104 The GAO interviewed representatives of the National Association of Immigration 
Judges, the American Immigration Lawyers Association and the American Bar Associa-
tion, Commission on Immigration, as well as attorneys from the Office of Chief Counsel of 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and private bar attorneys. Id at &-7. 
105 Id at 30. 
106 Gonzales's recommendations/press release is cited in note 87. The actual study 
does not appear to be publicly available, and could not be found after searching the web-
site of the Department of Justice. Articles referring to the study all appear to cite to the 
press release. 
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ministrative or judicial review impacts the performance of the 
IJs and the EOIR.101 
Again, this appears to be a common and unfortunate occur-
rence in GAO studies relating to immigration. There are some 
good examples of broader studies commissioned by the Adminis-
trative Conference of the United States or by the GAQ. 108 Each 
study seeks to answer a particular question and gather impor-
tant data, but these independent studies are flawed for their 
failure to look at the interactions with other agencies and deci-
sion makers. They are, at best, accurate snapshots. We are miss-
ing the important factors outside the frame of the camera lens. 
Rather than looking solely at the cases in the federal courts, 
Congress should have a clearer understanding of the entire proc-
ess. In this paper, I gathered data presenting a snapshot of the 
total volume of cases adjudicated at the first level of the adminis-
trative stage, the administrative appeal stage, and finally judi-
cial review. While I found no other study that had gathered this 
data into one place, this snapshot is only a beginning of the in-
quiry. Ideally, the study would differentiate key factors in the 
cases so that trends and problems could be evaluated. For each of 
the queries presented below, a study should not stop at a single 
level of agency adjudication, but should instead track the claims 
through as many levels as possible. While it might be impossible 
to include all cases due to limited resource or insufficient data, 109 
at least statistically relevant samples could be selected and 
evaluated in an effort to understand the factors contributing to 
increasing rates of administrative and judicial review .110 
107 As this article is being written, the BIA has moved forward to propose new regula-
tions authorizing changes in the appointment and use of IJs as temporary members of the 
BIA. See BIA: Composition of Board, Interim Rule (cited in note 88). 
108 See, for example, GAO, VA Disability Benefits (cited in note 79); GAO, Social Secu-
rity Administration, More Effort Needed to Assess Consistency of Disability Decisions 
(July 2004). The Administrative Conference of the United States ("ACUS") was an inde-
pendent agency that studied administrative processes. Congress stopped funding ACUS 
in 1995, but prior to that, ACUS commissioned several studies of the immigration adjudi-
cation system; one of the most comprehensive and deserving of replication was Stephen 
H. Legomsky, Forum Choices for the Review of Agency Adjudication: A Study of the Immi-
gration Process, 71 Iowa L Rev 1297 (1986). 
109 The GAO has specifically critiqued the EOIR for inconsistent and incomplete re-
cordkeeping. See EOIR GAO Study at 23-24 (cited in note 26). 
110 An excellent example of this is the John R.B. Palmer study which used sampling to 
determine if the A WO process was a significant factor in attorneys seeking judicial review 
of the BIA final order. The study found that the rates of review appeared to be the same 
for the cases notwithstanding the nature of the review conducted at the administrative 
appellate level. See Palmer, Yale-Loehr and Cronin 20 Georgetown Immig L J at 6 (cited 
in note 58). 
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I hesitate to outline a better query for the GAO in this arti-
cle. I believe the design of the study is important enough that 
Congress would be well advised to commission an analysis in an 
effort to shape a comprehensive study measuring the volume of 
and the forces behind the increase. As I have said, it is often the 
narrow questions asked that prevent Congress from having 
clearer insights into the dynamics of the process. The Depart-
ment of Homeland Security and the EOIR report significant ag-
gregate data in their annual year books. Yet the data is not cor-
related; nor can one look at the aggregate and draw clear conclu-
sions about agency prosecutorial priorities, resource allocation, 
or obstacles to enforcement and adjudication goals. Released in 
the spring of 2007, the 2006 Statistical Year Book of the Execu-
tive Office for Immigration Review includes more details about 
the adjudication process within the immigration courts and the 
BIA. While I have reported aggregate numbers here, even a cur-
sory review of the segregated data sets reported there offers fer-
tile ground for study. For example, the BIA total caseload is 
39, 707, this number includes appeals from denials of visa peti-
tions and represents more than just appeals from individual re-
moval cases. Appeals from individual IJ orders represent 85 per-
cent of the total BIA workload. When the reporting is based on 
the aggregate workload of the BIA, Congress might conclude that 
the rate of appeal from individual orders is less than it really is 
because a reader would assume the appeal rate is calculated 
based on 100 percent of the workload. The actual rate of appeal 
becomes more important when one learns that between 2005 and 
2006, as I was writing this article, the rate of appeal decreased 
from 12 to 9 percent. (See Figure 4). One can only speculate 
about the reason for the changes. Perhaps more people are con-
ceding removability and not appealing. Rather than challenging 
the removal order, the applicant seeks post removal waivers. 
While the CIS does not report the total number of waiver appli-
cations, based on my observations of attorney listserves, it ap-
pears that more people are appealing denials of waivers barring 
reentry or immigration to the U.S. after removal. Data concern-
ing the adjudication of these important waivers is not handled by 
the immigration courts but by the CIS offices abroad and then 
appealed to the Administrative Appeals Office ("AAO") of the 
CIS. I contacted the AAO and they do maintain these data but 
they are not published in the DHS Immigration Statistics. 
Perhaps the decrease in the rate of appeal from IJ orders 
from 12 to 9 percent may, in part, be due to the fact that a higher 
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percentage of the total orders issued by IJs are issued in absen-
tia. In 2004, in absentia order represented 47,407 of the total of 
302,049, or 15.6 percent; in 2005, in absentia orders represented 
100,994 of the total of 352,869, or 28.6 percent; and in 2006, in 
absentia orders represented 102,834 of the total of 365,851, or 28 
percent. See Figure 5 for data comparing in absentia orders to 
total removal proceedings. People subject to an in absentia order 
may not know they have been ordered removed and that could be 
their reason for not filing appeals. Without a regression analysis 
to determine which of the cases are being appealed, no easy con-
clusions can be drawn about why appeal rates to the BIA have 
decreased. In my view, many of these cases will become the fu-
ture workload of the EOIR as people file Motions to Reopen to try 
to set aside the in absentia orders. 
These comments may be obvious; any policy change has to be 
based on careful examination of the total pool of orders. Yet I 
raise these queries and concerns because in recent years the tes-
timony to Congress and the evaluative reports of the GAO do not 
appear to be looking beyond the surface. 
The empirical inquiries need to be much more sophisticated 
than simply counting the number of cases initiated in the admin-
istrative courts, the number of appeals to the BIA, the number of 
appeals of BIA orders, and the remand rates. While the aggre-
gate data show that the workloads are increasing, this does little 
to clarify which factors are having direct impact on the size and 
fairness of the entire process. Accordingly, I offer these sugges-
tions for some minimal data that should be included in a GAO or 
commissioned study: 
1. Where the case was initiated by the Department of 
Homeland Security ("DHS") and by which division of the 
DHS;m 
2. The identity of the individual IJ and the counsel repre-
senting both the Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
agency ("ICE") and the noncitizen. 112 It is even more im-
111 This is quite complex in and of itself. Cases can begin at the border, after enforce-
ment actions such as workplace searches, after criminal process including arrests of non-
citizens that were referred to the DHS, after applications for benefits such as seeking 
asylum or permanent residence via adjustment of status and even at the point an indi-
vidual seeks naturalization. All of these different types of cases are treated as value-
neutral and equal in the workload of the agency. 
ll2 These data too might reveal patterns of behavior that help reveal patterns of inef-
ficiency, and can help the administrator respond appropriately. In a sense this might be a 
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portant to identify those noncitizens who are not repre-
sented. 
3. Key characteristics of the individual m removal pro-
ceedings including: 
• Status, in other words, citizenship, lawful perma-
nent resident, nonimmigrant, over-stay, entry without 
inspection, 
• Age of respondent and whether dependent family 
members are also charged with removal, 
• Length of residence in the U.S.; 
4. The specific grounds for removal asserted by the 
agency;113 
5. Forms of relief sought; 
6. Use of translators and languages;ll4 
7. Length of administrative process and judicial reVIew 
process; 
8. Use of detention or bonds and at what stage m the 
process; 
9. Judicial stays of removal; and 
10. Execution of orders or subsequent deferred action by 
the agency. 115 
way of finding the few bad apples that are spoiling the barrel. Without these data we 
can't know if it is a few bad apples or if instead it is a species-wide issue. These data, 
while voluminous, would also help to begin analysis of situations where individuals are 
abusing the system or engaging in unprofessional or unethical conduct. Approval or de-
nial rates alone fire the imagination but can't be substitutes for assessment of perform-
ance. See TRAC Immigration, Facts and Figures, available at <http://trac.syr.edu/ 
immigration/facts/> (last visited Feb 24, 2007). 
ua The DHS reports on the executed orders of removal and describes the "grounds" 
but it does not indicate when there might have been multiple grounds of removal and the 
data are presented as aggregate totals. See 2005 Statistical Yearbook of the Department of 
Homeland Security, Table 40 (2006) ("DHS Statistical Table''), available at 
<http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/2005/018_2005_ Year book. pdf> 
(last visited Feb 27, 2007). 
u 4 The EOIR 2006 Statistical Year Book does report on the use of translators in cases. 
EOIR 2006 Statistical Year Book at Fl (cited in note 4). See page Fl reporting a list of 
languages used and the number of matters. Yet these data in isolation do not reveal 
whether these particular cases are more or less likely to be appealed or to have private 
counsel, etc. 
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While gathering this empirical data alone will not directly 
explain the causes of the increase in judicial review of immigra-
tion orders, the data will enable analysts to look at the interac-
tion of the factors and may aid in identifying factors in the proc-
ess that have the greatest effect on the entire system. The next 
section of this article elaborates further on why we need to 
measure these factors and more importantly to assess their in-
teractions. 
VIII. MEASURE THE INTERACTIONS AND VARIABLES AS 
THEY PLAY UPON EACH OTHER 
Certainly, if the agencies began to retain these data and 
regularly report them, they would still require analysis. Such 
analysis is required to see how the individual sets of data inter-
act and to discern the patterns within the sets. 
I can imagine dozens of significant queries that would help 
identify the major "movers" in the systems. Does the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion drive the system workloads, or does it 
prevent more cases from entering the system? Are the grounds of 
removal and agency perception of Congressional priorities prime 
motivators in the initiation and prosecution of cases? What role 
do national security concerns play in the removal system? Is the 
system dysfunctional because of a lack of resources for the ad-
ministrative hearings? What are the characteristics and fre-
quency of attorney error in the system? What are the common IJ 
and BIA errors, and how could they be reduced or eliminated? 
What procedures do the Courts of Appeals use to identify impor-
tant immigration cases presenting novel or complex issues? 
Which procedures help the Courts of Appeals manage the 
caseload, and which ones delay adjudication? Are the results in a 
case predictable based on the circuit, the panel of judges, the at-
torney representing either party, the lack of counsel, etc.? I hope 
you see the point. We need the data, but even more we need ac-
ll5 The DHS will sometimes prosecute a case to a final order of removal knowing that 
the agency cannot or is unlikely to actually execute on the order. The reasons for this may 
vary, and can include lack of cooperation from the home country, lack of funds to collect 
the individuals, or inability to pay for their removal. See Siskin, Immigration Enforce-
ment at 10 (cited in note 5). Again, the DHS does report aggregate numbers on final or-
ders removed but it does not report on those cases it chose to defer. See DHS Statistical 
Table at 40 (cited in note 113). Moreover, you cannot determine from this data when the 
administrative removal order became final. While the DHS completed 208,000 orders of 
removal in fiscal year 2005, many of those orders may have been pending for years. 
444 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [2007: 
cess to them and use of sophisticated sampling and multivariate 
analysis to draw conclusions. 
While I am not an expert in the varieties and forms of analy-
sis that might be used, I can suggest a few examples that might 
help further motivate Congress to commission such studies. 
Many people have counsel for the administrative hearing but are 
pro se at the BIA level; closer study of these patterns may iden-
tify a need for representation at the administrative level, even at 
government expense, to eliminate very weak appeals or to facili-
tate the analysis of the administrative agency.116 Based on the 
few interviews I conducted, it appears that many attorneys who 
handle immigration hearings and appeals to the BIA will not file 
a petition for review in the federal court. These attorneys rou-
tinely refer the case to counsel who specialize in federal litiga-
tion.117 While these specializations occur for a variety of reasons, 
one of the side effects is that the counsel who might have made 
errors in the advocacy before the administrative tribunal are not 
necessarily engaged in the case when those errors are identified 
by the judicial review process.118 The attorneys may repeat those 
same failures in the administrative hearings for new cases. Even 
if federal appellate counsel was successful in winning a remand 
in a particular case, there is no guarantee that the trial counsel 
will have learned from the litigation. 
Used well, these data sets can aid the government in im-
proving its efficiency or in meeting new prosecutorial priorities in 
the administrative system. While the DHS reports data on peo-
ple ordered removed, they do not report data on people charged 
with removal.119 Providing minimal information, such as the 
status of the individual in proceedings (lawful permanent resi-
dents or other) and the nature of the charges alleged, would aid 
116 While individuals have a statutory right to representation, the government is not 
obligated to pay for this representation. See INA § 292, codified at 8 USC § 1362 (2000). 
The EOIR and the BIA have wanted to conduct pilot studies to see if providing counsel for 
the noncitizens would aid or speed adjudication. 
117 My observation is based on interviews with staff at the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals and members of the American Immigration Lawyers Association. 
118 This is true for the government as well because the DOJ attorneys at OIL handle 
the federal litigation rather than the agency attorneys within ICE who prosecuted the 
administrative case. While it may be true in other specialized practices areas that trial 
and appellate attorneys are often different, this is a new problem in immigration law and 
is cause for some concern, as a new specialized litigation bar is developing separately 
from the attorneys who represent people at the administrative agency level. 
119 See DHS Statistical Table (cited in note 113). Again, while the DHS reports on the 
orders of removal and a single basis supporting the removal, it does not report on all 
cases initiated. 
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Congress in monitoring the prosecutorial priorities of ICE. It 
would also enable the administrative courts to better understand 
the patterns of issues likely to be litigated and perhaps provide 
additional resources to respond to those cases. For example, as 
ICE advanced the removal priority of noncitizens with criminal 
convictions, the EOIR had to establish more courtrooms and 
judges near the prisons and detention centers. Judges may need 
additional training on country conditions or forensic issues if 
there is a pattern of similar types of cases being referred by bor-
der inspections or by the asylum corps. Identification of these 
patterns will also help Congress evaluate whether the statutory 
basis of removal and the forms of relief are adequate and appro-
priate as applied. 
As an example of how this type of analysis can help, consider 
the changes that resulted when Congress amended the definition 
of persecution to include victims of coercive family planning. The 
volume of Chinese asylum claims jumped. What does the jump 
mean? It may mean that Congress identified a real need for pro-
tection, but what does the high rate of refusal of these claims 
signify? The refusal rate may mean Congress selected a standard 
that is difficult to prove or that opened a door to claims that are 
based on false forensic evidence. The swell may indicate that the 
IJs became overwhelmed by the similarity of the cases and found 
it difficult to identify false claims. The high rate of refusal may 
mean that Congress needs to revisit the statutory standard and 
burdens of proof. 120 We can learn more if we know more than 
simply "the rate of refusal" or the aggregate number of cases. We 
need a contextualized analysis. 
What should we make of the disparity between the rising 
number of final orders and the huge number of unexecuted or-
ders?121 If we are unable to remove a significant number of peo-
ple who have final orders, should the agency take earlier steps to 
prioritize placing the individual in proceedings or create admin-
istrative procedures for holding such cases in abeyance rather 
than forcing them through the system ?122 
120 See EOIR 2005 Statistical Year Book at Jl-J2 (cited in note 25); TRAC Immigra-
tion, Facts (cited in note 112). 
121 An unexecuted order may mean that the government has chosen not to physically 
remove the individual, has lost track of the individual or is unable to secure the docu-
ments necessary to effectuate removal. 
122 Again, studying the implications of such an abeyance process would require an 
assessment of the harms and benefits to the government enforcement as well as the indi-
viduals involved. An individual who wishes to complete an asylum claim should not be 
stymied from that goal by the government choosing not to continue adjudication. Still, the 
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Congress should commission a variety of studies using mul-
tivariate approaches to the data. While finding direct cause and 
effect may be elusive, the analysis will surely reveal a more so-
phisticated understanding of the "how and why" of the increasing 
caseload in the federal courts, while also aiding the agency and 
Congress in refining and optimizing the adjudication process. 
CONCLUSION 
Are we willing to make the measurements and understand 
the dynamics of the immigration removal system? If Newton 
taught us anything, he taught us to stop making assumptions 
about the properties of things and to base our findings on careful 
analysis of causes and effects. Moreover, he contributed the tools 
to understand that universal forces impact the actions of physi-
cal materials. Until we search for the interrelationships and look 
at the catalyzing effects that drive the performance of the adjudi-
cators and the litigants, our analysis will be imprecise. 
Congress may be able to design a better system for the adju-
dication of immigration removal cases, but before attempting to 
design the new golden process, I urge Congress and governmen-
tal auditors to reflect more carefully and systemically on the op-
eration of the current system. We can't get there from here until 
we understand the qualities and dynamics of the here and now. 
patterns of litigation deserve closer study and the DHS may want to exercise much 
greater discretion in selecting cases for full prosecution. Further, Congress may want to 
create alternative adjudication systems for those individuals who believe they are quali-
fied for benefits such as cancellation of removal, a discretionary form of relief that results 
in permanent resident status after ten years of continuous presence in the country. Cur-
rently, individuals have to be placed into removal proceedings to seek adjudication of this 
benefit. See INA § 240A, codified at 8 USC § 1229b (2000). 
